Army Spy Plane Disappears Over Colombia, Speculation of Coming US Intervention Abounds 7/30/99

Drug War Chronicle, recent top items


recent blog posts "In the Trenches" activist feed


A US Army spy plane disappeared over Colombian rebel territory last Friday, days before an official five day tour of the region by US drug czar Barry McCaffrey. McCaffrey told a news conference in Bogota on Monday that "[T]he evidence so far would indicate that the five brave American aviators and two Colombian air force officers have probably lost their lives in a fatal accident." Searchers on Wednesday confirmed that the plane had slammed into the side of a Colombia mountain, and that they had pulled four bodies out of the wreckage.

The crash has draw attention to the issue of growing US military involvement in Colombia. According to the Los Angeles Times, (7/28), 160 service personnel and 30 civilian Department of Defense employees are stationed in Colombia, on missions including drug crop eradication, the installation and use of spying equipment, the operation of reconnaissance planes like the one that crashed, and the training of Colombian anti-narcotics battalions. US military activity in Colombia first became significant in 1993, taking the form of humanitarian work such as road building and other infrastructure and health work. Last year, American personnel traveled to Colombia to participate in seven special joint training projects of 30 to 40 people each.

The plane's disappearance, the growing US support to the Colombian military, and frequent visits to Bogota by high-ranking US officials, have fueled speculation among Colombians about possible US intervention, according to the Associated Press on 7/26. The Colombian paper El Espectador ran an editorial the same day discussing intervention ( While US officials continue to insist that they are interested in counternarcotics (fighting drugs), not in counterinsurgency (fighting the rebels), they also admit that the distinction between the two types of operations has become blurred. According to a Reuters story on 7/26, McCaffrey told reporters before leaving Miami on Sunday that the line between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency no longer existed. McCaffrey has asked Congress to approve a $1 billion increase in counternarcotics spending in Latin America, with $570 billion specified for Colombia. Stan Goff, a former member of the US Special Forces, wrote in The (Raleigh, NC) News and Observer, that "When I was training Colombian Special Forces in Tolemaida [Colombia] in 1992, my team was there allegedly to aid the counternarcotics effort. Narcotics were the cover story for a similar trip to Peru in 1991. In both cases we were giving military forces training in infantry counterinsurgency doctrine."

The rhetorical focus by US officials on Colombia's civil war and rebel forces represents a marked shift from the focus on individual "drug lords" and cartels that dominated the discussion during the 80's and most of this decade. Headlines screamed out the evil-doings and fates of a steady stream of "archenemies of the day," as each drug kingpin and trafficking organization gave way to the next, for example:

  • 1988: Mexican police arrest drug lord Angel Felix Gallardo;
  • 1/93: Colombian kingpin Ivan Urdinola gets 17 years;
  • 6/93: Mexican police kill top cocaine trafficker Emilio Quintero Payan;
  • 12/93: Medellin cartel chief Pablo Escobar killed by Colombian police and military;
  • 1995: Cali leader Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela and other Cali Cartel leaders arrested;
  • 2/96: Mexican kingpin Juan Garcia-Abrego arrested;
  • 3/96: Escaped Cali Cartel leader Jose Santacruz Londono killed;
  • 7/97: Mexican kingpin Amado Carrillo Fuentes dies during plastic surgery intended to conceal his identity.

The demise of individual drug lords and trafficking organizations, however, has not had a long-term impact on the availability of cocaine. According to the DEA's STRIDE report, the average purity-adjusted US street price of cocaine has dropped more than 50 percent, from $379 per pure gram in 1981 to $179 in 1997, while the dealer-level price has dropped 75 percent, from $191 to $46. A report released last month by the US General Accounting Office stated that the Medellin and Cali cartels had been replaced by "hundreds of smaller and more decentralized organizations" capable of producing a "black cocaine" that is extremely difficult to detect.

The Wisconsin-based Columbia Support Network ( issued a statement yesterday urging President Clinton and Congress to reject McCaffrey's proposal, calling instead for the US to support the peace process and nonviolent grassroots community organizations, such as the Peace Community in Urabá and civilian organizations in the Middle Magdalena region. Cecilia Zarate of CSN told the Week Online, "Colombia has been in the middle of a civil war for most of this century, and the civil war is caused by deep structural characteristics of Colombian society, mainly that the country is not very wealthy, and most of the wealth is concentrated in a few hands. And the country, although formally a political democracy, is really not one in practice. It's a society that excludes people politically, economically and socially. This situation generated a movement that has been active since the beginning of the century, basically at the beginning for issues of land."

Zarate continued, "I am not apologizing for the rebels. They make money from charging taxes on peasants that produce coca. But the conflict is more profound, because why do the peasants have to produce coca? Because they have been expelled from the countryside. The drug lords are buying and buying land and expelling the peasants, and using private armies like the paramilitaries. So, if the United States uses drugs as an excuse to give money to Colombia, because the rebels are involved in getting money from drugs, they also should look at the Colombian army itself, and they should look at the paramilitary leaders, because most of them who are very linked to the Colombian army are drug dealers." Paramilitary organizations are thought to be responsible for most of the 30,000 political murders committed over the past ten years.

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr. (US Navy, retired), Deputy Director of the Center for Defense Information (, believes that military approaches to the drug problem are doomed to failure. Carroll told the Week Online, "The problem is, you can't do a war on drugs. Drugs are an existing problem and have dimensions that extend all the way from the streets of the major cities of the United States, right down into the jungle, and it's almost impossible to win a war against drugs. So if you think that you're going to increase the level of your effort by simply adding more money and more planes and struggling more directly with the problem, I think you're deluding yourself. The drug problem is an enduring and sustained problem that we're going to have to manage over time, and attack the root causes of the problem, not simply pour more money into military operations."

Carroll continued, "I believe that the data show that money spent in direct involvement in the military side, trying to act against the source of supply and the routes of transportation, is doomed to failure, and you get very little return on your money. The only potential for making progress in your management is to address the causes of the narcotics problem, and that essentially lies in the demand for the product in the United States. You've got to deal with the demand, because you can't solve the supply problem militarily."

(See our report on the Colombia situation and the McCaffrey funding proposal in last week's issue of the Week Online,

-- END --
Link to Drug War Facts
Please make a generous donation to support Drug War Chronicle in 2007!          

PERMISSION to reprint or redistribute any or all of the contents of Drug War Chronicle (formerly The Week Online with DRCNet is hereby granted. We ask that any use of these materials include proper credit and, where appropriate, a link to one or more of our web sites. If your publication customarily pays for publication, DRCNet requests checks payable to the organization. If your publication does not pay for materials, you are free to use the materials gratis. In all cases, we request notification for our records, including physical copies where material has appeared in print. Contact: the Drug Reform Coordination Network, P.O. Box 18402, Washington, DC 20036, (202) 293-8340 (voice), (202) 293-8344 (fax), e-mail [email protected]. Thank you.

Articles of a purely educational nature in Drug War Chronicle appear courtesy of the DRCNet Foundation, unless otherwise noted.

Issue #101, 7/30/99 House Reinstates "Social Riders" in District of Colombia Appropriations Bill | New Mexico Republicans Stop Short of Repudiating Governor | Jamaica: Lawmakers Consider Decriminalization of Marijuana, Medical Marijuana Research Facility | Clinton Administration Proposes Changes to Methadone Regulations | Army Spy Plane Disappears Over Colombia, Speculation of Coming US Intervention Abounds | Australian State to Open Legal Heroin Injecting Room | DEA Chief Acknowledges Agency's Ineffectiveness | Newsbriefs | Senate Considering Raising Methamphetamine Penalties | Editorial: Body Bags
Mail this article to a friend
Send us feedback on this article
This issue -- main page
This issue -- single-file printer version
Drug War Chronicle -- main page
Chronicle archives
Subscribe now!
Out from the Shadows HEA Drug Provision Drug War Chronicle Perry Fund DRCNet en EspaŮol Speakeasy Blogs About Us Home
Why Legalization? NJ Racial Profiling Archive Subscribe Donate DRCNet em PortuguÍs Latest News Drug Library Search
special friends links: SSDP - Flex Your Rights - IAL - Drug War Facts the Drug Reform Coordination Network (DRCNet)
1623 Connecticut Ave., NW, 3rd Floor, Washington DC 20009 Phone (202) 293-8340 Fax (202) 293-8344 [email protected]