Alert: Tell Congress to Repeal Unjust Crack Cocaine Sentences

KARL WHITE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

KARL E. WHITE CIVIL ACTION
CASE #09-3412, 09-4138, & 09-4324
Plaintiff

v.

G. MICHAEL GREEN, ET AL.,
Defendant

INFORMAL BRIEF

DIRECTIONS: Answer the following questions about your appeal or petition for review to the best of your ability. Use additional sheets of paper if necessary. You need not limit your brief solely to this form, but you should be certain that any brief you file contains answers to the questions below. The Court prefers short and direct statements.

1. JURISDICTION:

What orders of the District Court are you appealing?

Orders Docket #2, 26, 42, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60, 64, 69

What is the date of the orders?

#2 filed 3/26/09, #26 filed 7/13/09, #42 filed 8/4/09, # 53 filed 9/8/09, #54 filed 9/8/09, #55 filed 9/8/09, #58 filed 9/24/09, #60 filed 10/6/09, #64 filed 10/20/09, #69 filed 11/17/09

When did you file your notice of appeal or petition for review?

See Docket #4 concerning Orders Docket #2 and #26. See appeal filed on 8/14/09 and 8/16/09.see Docket #’s49, 61,62 , 65,AND67.

Statement of the Case

1. The District Court was called upon to decide a deprivation of a substantial right which can never be cured and a lost of liberty that can never be made good as indicated in the Brief of Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid and Defender Association cite as Westlaw 1974 Wl 186449(U.S.)id at *9 page 6 The same brief in which the Supreme Court of the United States considered when it decided Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, which defines minimal due process right of indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions Pugh v. Rainwater 336F. Supp. 490 1972 and created the standard by which all states must comply.

2. The district court did not comply with the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Pugh v. Rainwater 336F. Supp. 490 1972 in regards minimal due process right of indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions ’ In or around 37 years ago, the United States Supreme Court settled the issues at bar in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975;Pugh v. Rainwater 336F. Supp. 490 1972 and the Attorney Generals of several states, filed motions in opposition and requested re-hearings on the issue and there request were denied. The United States Supreme Court did not overturned their decision in Pugh v. Rainwater argument which took the U.S. Supreme Court (5) five years to settle 37 years ago.

3. Wherefore all the defendants listed in this caption were stripped of their official capacity as either Judge; Prosecutor ,pre-trial agents, Domestic Relations agent and/or prison officials and was not privileged by law nor had a legal authority to act in there prospective capacities in which they are employed in criminal case No. 1070-06 and Domestic Relations civil complaint No. 49681-2, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

4. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants replied with a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff moved to stay the Defendants motion to dismiss pending his Motion for Summary Judgment.

5. When the judge receives a motion for summary judgment, he or she looks at all the legal
\papers that have been sent in by both sides and asks: is there any real disagreement about the important facts in this case, and whether “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [plaintiff] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).He did not ,he should have decided the question of summary judgment .The District Court required Plaintiff to respond to defendants motion to dismiss on or before July 24, 2009; wherefore, he change the standard of review of the matter before him.

6. Plaintiff filed Summary Judgment and defendants filed their motion to dismiss,
understandably taking this course of action effectively circumvented the district courts obligations to evaluate submissions of facts that was entered on record and give way to rendering a decision on behalf of defendants . A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp., 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5901, at *21. Factual allegations in the complaint must merely “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true,” Id .

7. This is not the same standard, had he properly considered the important facts concerning the issues at bar, as summery judgment requires, one would have to side with the Supreme Court of the United States decisions in regarding the due process rights of indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions as outlined in Pugh v. Rainwater 336 F. Supp. 490.

8. The District Court Orders denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend and granting Defendants motion to dismiss effectively denied any possibility of retrieving discoverable materials, admissions, depositions, interrogatories, productions, inspection and/or hamper Plaintiff’s ability to properly secure his claim thus receive proper judicial investigation of those issue in question . A pro se litigant civil claim should not be dismissed until he has an opportunity for discoverable material.

9. The District Judge failed his mandatory duty to comply with the Supreme Court decision as indicated above in regards to the Supreme Court’s final decision concerning the rights of indigent defendants as outlined in Brief of Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid and Defender Association cite as Westlaw 1974 Wl 186449(U.S.) and Gerstein v. Pugh 420 U.S. 103, Supreme Court of the United States opinion and judgment outlined in Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490,

10. The District Court erroneously claims they have immunity in some form or another and cites numerous cases which do not apply in view Ex Parte Young argument and the clearly establish Federal Civil Rights violations cited in Pugh v. Rainwater 336F. Supp. 490 1972 which can never be cured. Plaintiff cites numerous U.S. Supreme Court and District Court cases which argues the contrary that the Defendants violated clearly establish Civil Rights that they were enforcing an unconstitutional statute the (application for continuance) beyond Federal statute Pugh v. Rainwater 336F. Supp. 490 1972 which provides representation at the first hearing (preliminary arraignment) as well as a prompt judicial determination of probable cause (preliminary hearing) in a timely manner Gerstein V. Pugh, and (Ex Parte Young 209 U.S. 123 (1908) cited herein “established they were individually stripped of their official character when they done so. Wherefore, Defendants become merely another citizen who can constitutionally be brought before a Court by a party seeking civil damages.

11. The district court had jurisdiction concerning the matters of emergency injunction and temporary restraining order, electing not to interfere with ongoing proceeding in the Delaware County Court, was prejudicial . While a Federal court cannot interfere in a criminal case already pending in a state court, and while, as a general rule, a court of equity cannot enjoin criminal proceedings, those rules do not apply when such proceedings are brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional state statute, after the unconstitutionality thereof has become the subject of inquiry in a suit pending in a Federal court which has first obtained jurisdiction there over; and, under such circumstances, the Federal court has the right in both civil and criminal cases to hold and maintain such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

12. WHEREFORE, when the district court elected not to invoke its jurisdiction rights over the matter at hand as cited above , it effectively threw plaintiff under the bus so to speak in so much as the lower court has free rein with impunity to do it will (issue warrant for plaintiff arrest and or continue its disentrancement of plaintiff as cited herein ) with out judicial investigation .

13. On the issue of disqualification of HON. THOMAS N. O’NEILL, JR., Plaintiff filed a motion to have him recuse himself because of his appearance of impartiality concerning his defiance to adhere to the case law that takes precedence concerning the issues as cited above. It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice. Furthermore, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law then the judge has given another example of his “appearance of partiality” which further disqualifies the judge. he elected to rule in favor of himself , war against the constitution ,dismiss this case and render Plaintiff’s motion to file amended complaint as moot. A violation of your rights is not moot just because it is over if it is “capable of repetition, but evading review ”and therefore denying plaintiff a remedy at law and place him in harms way of hostel prosecution .as noted herein,

14. Said judge denied plaintiff the right to amend his complaint ,a Court should not deny a chance to amend, especially if the Plaintiff is alleging a Civil Rights violation. Ricciuti V.N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 941 F.2d.119.123 (2d Cir. 1991). There is no dispute that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard that formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct.594 (1972). During the initial stages of litigation, a Court is obligated to construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of a pro se litigant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3d. Cir. 1997). A fact is material if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505.

15. District court ruling in Plaintiffs request for default judgment was in error defendants did not filed an answer or motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from June 8th, the date when the request for waiver of summons and complaint was sent. In or around 85 days has lapsed since the date of service of complaint and request for waiver of service, was received, see USPS Certified Mail receipt attached. The item was delivered to said Defendants on June 9th, see USPS Tracking Confirm receipt attached. Since no answer, motion or responsive pleading has been filed within the time limit fixed as indicated above and it appears from the record that this Defendant is not an infant or incompetent person nor in the military service where for said request should have been granted.

16. The district court allowed Defendants, Michael G. Green, e al. to waged war against the constitution and defied the Supreme Court of the United States decisions in regard to the Civil Rights of Plaintiff in his criminal case and Civil proceedings as described here in.

Statement of facts

17. On 4/7/07, a police officer stopped Plaintiff freedom of movement without probable cause and performed a warrant less search which resulted in an arrest for an outstanding warrant, see Exhibits DB1 through 7. Transcripts of Proceedings (case no.1070-06 ) The police officer didn’t file an affidavit of probable cause for the stop and Plaintiff was taken to George Hill Correctional Facility, see Exhibit A. On 1/8/08, the case was Nolle Prosequi by Michael G. Green, see Exhibit 00 and Exhibit DB7.

18. Judge Toll presided over the bench warrant hearing of said case, see Exhibit DB1, page 1 and Exhibit DB3, page 8, 2 through 10. Mr. Phil Pisani presided over the bail portion of the case, see Exhibit DB1 page 4. Ian McCurdy represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, see Exhibit DB2 . State Attorney Christopher Dirosato represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, see Exhibit DB-5 State Attorney Mary Mann, Esq. represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, see Exhibit DB-6. The Honorable Joseph P. Cronin, Jr. presided over the case as Judge see Exhibit DB-6 and portions of the Domestic Relations aspect, see Exhibit 40. Mr. Lopresti presided over the bail portion of the case, see Exhibit DB3, page 3, ID at page 22 and page 9 through page 14.

19. During this incarceration a Domestic Relations detainer was lodged against the Plaintiff on 12/28/06 exhibit A-1 .while he was incarcerated. resulting in the seizures and/or garnishments of wages listed herein and in the complaint, see Exhibits 20 through 40. see Exhibit A-1. Said detainer specifically states hold seventy-two hours pending hearing. Seventy-eight days in or around lapse before a hearing was held in or around 3/17/06 see Exhibits 21 and 28.Whether a four-day lapse is constitutional while a six-day lapse is not, will be a difficult factual question Pugh v. Rainwater 483 F.2d 778

20. Prior to this event, plaintiff did not owe any child supporting for in or around 15 years since 1989 and did not have to notify the Courts of his whereabouts. Defendants arbitrarily elected, as they claim to send said notice of hearing to the last known address in which case plaintiff did not live there, nor did he receive the Summons because he was living in Florida on 7/28/04 at Broward Outreach Center, see Exhibit A3 and was incarcerated in the State of Florida at Broward County Prison on possession charges.

21. Date of incident was 1/2/05, see Exhibit A4. He was incarcerated at least 5 months, see Exhibit A5. Defendants Order of Court to freeze Plaintiff’s assets id at Exhibit 30 and to seize his assets, see Exhibit 20, were dated May and June of 2005. Plaintiff has no knowledge of the Summons or notice to appear in Court which is issued on this Docket, because he never received it because he was in Florida as indicated above. Wherefore his due process right to notice hearing and appeal was violated and a illegal warrant was issued which resulted in the detainer and a Court appearance seventy-eight days later in or around as listed above. The Honorable Barry C. Dozor the Honorable Michael F. X. Coll on 5/8/08, seized Plaintiff’s stimulus payment from the U.S. Treasury Department and Federal Income Tax for in or around $350 and was not privileged by law to do so, see Exhibit 29 and 31. Sue Williams was not privileged by law to seize 491.30 of Plaintiff’s stimulus payment from the U.S. Treasury Department and Federal Income Tax for in or around $350.

22. Mimi Bradley Walker, Debra S, Schilling, Kathleen Connor, and Monica Bettie are either Department Heads and/or Caseworker in the Domestic Relations portion of this suit and are directly or indirectly responsible for the seizures and/or garnishment of Plaintiff‘s wages, the seizure of his assets from the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of $300 on 6/13/08 and $491.30 on 5/09/08, see Exhibits 20 through 40; and attempted and/or threatened to suspend his driver‘s license and/or threatened to place plaintiff in prison, see Exhibits 20 through 40. Judge Barry D. Dozer filed an Order to freeze Plaintiff’s assets, see Docket #49681-2/Exhibit 30 and handled the fugitive complaint in case, see Exhibit B. Michael Fxcoll filed an Order to seize Plaintiff’s assets, see Exhibits 20 and 21.

23. The incident that gives rise to account above was Plaintiff’s arrest on
12/25/05, see Exhibit D1 and DB1 ID page 4, 2 through 18. Plaintiff was denied sufficient assistant public defenders representation, at his first hearing on 12/25/05 (Magistrate) case no. 1070 -06 which he was entitled to as required by Gerstein v. Pugh 420 U.S. 103, Supreme Court of the United States opinion and judgment outlined in Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490,
.
24. Plaintiff’s preliminary hearings in said cases were not held in three days and they were not properly postponed or waived as required by Gerstein v. Pugh 420 U.S. 103, Supreme Court of the United States opinion and judgment outlined in Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490, Plaintiff was not released after 3 days if the preliminary hearings were not held as required by Gerstein v. Pugh 420 U.S. 103, Supreme Court of the United States opinion and judgment outlined in Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490, Plaintiff was falsely imprisoned for in or around 10 ten months before the case was Nolle Prosequi by Michael G. Green,

25. The Geo Group, Inc. and/or George Hill Correctional Facility Top bunks exceed 5 feet in height , do not have ladders or guardrails and are in violation of O.S.H.A. height restrictions’ concerning elevations over 19 inches ,they have all ready settled any dispute regarding said strip search policy see Allison v. The Geo Group, Inc settlement and its beyond doubt plaintiff was incarcerated during said period ,thus subjected to the same violations.

4. Statement of Related Cases

None.

5. Did the district court or agency incorrectly decide the facts of your case ?yes If so, what facts?

26. The incarceration of Plaintiff without providing him with sufficient assistant Public Defender representation at the first hearing (preliminary arraignment), those persons who are entitled to representations violates his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. And violates the Supreme Court of the United States opinion and final judgment regarding the minimal due process right of indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions as cited in Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490

27. The due process clause and the constitution prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person, prohibit the pretrial incarceration of accused persons without a judicial determination of probable cause in a timely manner 3 days in Pennsylvania if the hearing is not properly postponed or waived.

28. Prolonging Plaintiff preliminary hearing for in or around 30 days in one case ,78 in another and falsely imprisoning plaintiff for in or around 10 ten months violates his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The submission of an application for continuance prolonging confinement with out properly postponing or sign waiver as out lined in Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490 .is in conflict and/or inconsistent with the controlling case law id at Gerstein v. Pugh 420 U.S. 103, Supreme Court of the United States opinion and judgment outlined in Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490,

and enforcement of said application is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s position in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, (1908) the attempt of a State Officer to enforce an unconstitutional State Statute is a proceeding without authority of, and does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental captivity, and is an illegal act, an officer stripped of his official character and is subject in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to his officers immunity from the responsibility to the Supreme authority of the United States.

29. The Defendants G. Michael Green, Chris D. Rosato, Ian McCurdy, Mary Mann, Joseph Cronin, William R. Toal, Jr., Michael Fxcoll, and Barry C. Dozer after denying Plaintiff due process as indicated above at his preliminary arraignment and prolonging his preliminary hearings for in or around 30 days ,in one case and 78 in another and falsely imprisoning plaintiff for 10 ten months can not enforce or authorize Mimi Bradley Walker, Debra S. Schilling , Kathleen Connor and George Hill Correctional Facility or any other state agent to proceed in an official character arising out of said denials of plaintiffs minimal due process right listed here in. Said act it the fruit of the Poisonous Tree .

30. The Geo Group, Inc. and/or George Hill Correctional Facility can not placed plaintiff or any one for that matter in harms way of death by requiring them to virtually live on a bed over 5 feet in elevation which don’t have ladders/ guard rails and are in violation of OSHA regulations concerning elevations over 19 inches.

6. Did the district court of the agency apply the wrong law (either cases or statutes)? Yes If so, what law do you want applied?

Brief of Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid and Defender Association cite as Westlaw 1974 Wl 186449(U.S.)

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975)

U.S. Supreme Court Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)

Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490

Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778

United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment … 3, 6, 7, 8

Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County Oklahoma Petitioner v. Jill Brown et al 520 U.S. 397. 117 S. Ct. 1382

Gold v. Bissell,1 wend.210(n.y. sup.ct.18280.’id.at 201)

Occupational Safety Hazard Administration ;process safety management labors -agc education and training fund hand book regulations section 10 fall protection systems section 11 guardrails section 12 ladders

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Bunyon v. Burke County, 285 F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
Jones v. Lopez, 262 F.Supp.2d 701 (W.D. ex. 2001).

7.Are there any other reasons why the district courts judgment or the agencies decision was wrong? Yes If so briefly state the reasons.

Argument

31. Delaware county Judges and Prosecutors for 37 years, I emphasize 37 years denied sufficient assistant public defenders to represent, at the first hearing those persons who are entitled to public representation, Did not afford a preliminary hearing within the applicable period of time three (3) days as indicated by Pennsylvania statute and or the Supreme Court of the United States opinion and final judgment regarding the minimal due process right of indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions see Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490 3 days in if the hearing is not properly postponed or waived.

32. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for 37 years have state statutes, state case laws, and the rules of criminal procedure. that are not consistent with said decision indicated above.

33. When said defendants continue prosecution beyond the minimal due process right of indigent defendants as indicated above , they violate the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)"). The attempt of a State officer to enforce an unconstitutional statute is a proceeding without authority of, and does not affect, the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity, and is an illegal act, and the officer is stripped of his official character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The state has no power to impart to its officers immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States

34. The Ex Parte Young 209 U.S. 123 Court held that when a state official does something that is unconstitutional, the official cannot possibly be doing it in the name of the state, because the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution means that (the Constitution overrides all the laws of the states, invalidating any contrary laws).

35. Defendants claim they have immunity from prosecution for violations of these civil rights as indicated here in ,this would defy logic and the law . A reasonable person would deduce that the Ex Parte Young 209 U.S. 123 Court s statement;” proceeding without authority of”, “an illegal Act “ and “the officer is stripped of his official character” would be the equivalent of say (a prosecutor and judge being disbarred from practicing law) how then can that judge make an official ruling in a court case and or the prosecutor officially prosecute a case with out meeting the legal qualifications under the law.

36. The Supreme Court of the United States held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution, also if the party is denied any of his/her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of “interference with interstate commerce”,

37. Plaintiffs arrest on 4-7-07 was the fruit of the unconstitutional seizure and or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree if one properly consider the procedural requirements of due process as it relates to my argument out lined herein..

38. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibits any State from depriving any person of liberty without due process of law this Court has held, with respect to other deprivations, that due process minimally requires a fill hearing, substantially contemporaneous with the taking, [FN*] at which there is an opportunity to be heard before an independent and neutral decisionmal decisionmaker. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, …… U.S. ……, 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1901, 1902 (1974) (property); Fueutes v. Sheuin, 407 U.S. 67, 81, 82, 83, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994, 1995, 1996 (1972) (property): Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647, 649, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1211 (1972) (custody of children); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 1591 (1971) (driver’s license): Wiscronsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91, S. Ct. 507, 510 (1971) (right to purchase liquor); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-268, 271, 90 S. Ct. 101.1, 1020, 1.022 (1970) (public assistance); *6Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337, 342, 89 S. Ct. 1820, 1823 (1969) (garnishment of wages).

39. More directly relevant, the Supreme Court has been equally solicitous with respect to the due process rights of persons whose right to conditional liberty is at issue. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972) (parolees); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973) (probationers). Prior to final adjudication of their right to remain at liberty, parolees and probationers are entitled to a prompt preliminary hearing, before an independent decisionmaker, with a right to be heard on the question of whether there is probable cause. Morrissey v. Brewer, id. At 485-487, 92 S. Ct. at 2602-2603. Thus, the right to a preliminary hearing is not negated by the existence of procedures at a later time for a final determination of rights. See, also Fuentes v. Shevin, id. At 81-82, 92 S. Ct. at 1995, 1996; Bell v. Burson id. At 540, 91 S. Ct. at 1590. When the judge receives a motion to dismiss, he or she is supposed to look at only the complaint. His or her question is; could you have a right to judgment in your favor if you could prove in court everything you say in tour complaint. The District Court did not answer the question did Defendants violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

40. Defendants G. Michael Green, Chris D. Rosato, Ian McCurdy, Mary Mann, Joseph Cronin, William R. Toal, Jr., Michael Fxcoll, and Barry C. Dozer have full knowledge that the incident that gave rise to the initial arrest took place 12/25/05 and that the (Court specifically stated in Exhibit DB2 to id. Page 6, number 22 through 24 that Pennsylvania does not require attorneys at preliminary arraignments).

a. In addition, Mr. Chris Rosato stated in Exhibit DB3 id. at page 61, number 24 to 25 and page 62, number 1 through 12 “I’ll stipulate that probably 99.999 percent of all defendants in the County of Delaware do not have attorneys at the preliminary arraignment.

b. Additionally JUDGE CRONIN in the Delaware county times 1-9-2008 in my best estimation admits not accomplishing the constitutional mandates fore people picked up on bench warrants ect. and if you properly consider his role in relation to the complaint The issues at bar ,the date the case was Nolle Prosequi by Michael G. Green, its timing and why .You could come to conclusion these admissions where prompted by plaintiff objections to the proceedings concerning his case.

41. The controlling case law governing what due process minimally requires is that there
will be provided sufficient assistant public defenders to represent, both at the first hearing and at the preliminary hearing, those persons who are entitled to public representation, Pugh v. Rainwater 336 F. Supp. 490 id at page 2 number 11 and if the Magistrate finds that defendant is indigent, he shall appoint a public offender to represent him Pugh v. Rainwater 336 F. Supp. 490, id at page 12. If the defendant is not afforded with what due process minimally requires as indicated above, all charges shall be withdrawn and if the defendant is incarcerated, he shall be immediately released because this violation of a substantial right that can never be cured.

42. In case of conflict between this plan, all State statutes, case law and rules of criminal procedure will apply to the extent that they are not inconsistent with what due process minimally requires. Pugh v. Rainwater 336 Supp. 490, page 4, numbers 19 and 20. As indicated above, in the controlling case law sited, Defendants denied Plaintiff what due process minimally requires before you take his freedom, appointment at counsel at the preliminary arraignment and immediate release if incarcerated as sanctions for failing to hold the preliminary hearing in a timely manner, wherefore, the application for continuance, Exhibit D1 which circumvents the rights in question here and prolongs confinement is an unconstitutional statute ,case law and or rules of criminal procedure .

43. See Ex Parte v. Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) the attempt of a State Officer to enforce an unconstitutional State Statute is a proceeding without authority of, and does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental captivity, and is an illegal the officer is of stripped of his official character and is subject in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to his officers immunity from the responsibility to the Supreme authority of the United States.

44. The Defendants were not privileged by law to continue prosecution after said denial, and/or either have the authority to impart to Phil Pisani and Ms. Lopresti the authority to hold bail hearings. Everyone herein is sued individually and/or are governmental and private bodies and as such are liable on the basis of enforcement of the unconstitutional State statute through their employer-employee relationship, they are the “moving force” behind the injury’s alleged, see Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County Oklahoma Petitioner v. Jill Brown et al 520 U.S. 397. 117 S. Ct. 1382.

45. Plaintiff was arrested on 12/25/05. His preliminary hearing was scheduled in 3 days. The State requested a continuance until 1/11/06. Reason marked “other”, see Exhibit D1, case came from other Court. The State granted yet another continuance. New hearing date 1/25/06. Reason marked officer witness unavailable. In Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F. 2d 778 id at page 15, [**32] Whether a four-day lapse is constitutional while a six-day lapse is not would be a difficult factual question.

46. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against a state official who, acting under color of law, deprives a person of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 118 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1992). We note at the outset that whether an official is entitled to immunity in a state court proceeding alleging a violation of section 1983 is governed by federal, not state, immunity doctrine. Finch v. Wemlinger, 310 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Minn. 1981). And whether a public official is entitled to absolute immunity under federal law presents a question of law, which we [*5] review de novo. Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. 1996); Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Minn. 1988). In doing so, we analyze this question independent of the merits of the underlying action. Johnson, 553 N.W.2d at 45; Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 675. An official claiming immunity bears the burden of establishing entitlement to it. Finch, 310 N.W.2d at 70. "all the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978). Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993). Qualified immunity, the most common variety, protects officials so long as "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. . Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13, 96 S. Ct. 984, 989 n.13, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976) (noting that absolute immunity automatically "defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions were within the scope of the immunity. The Defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity or any type of immunity because they were acting without authority and were stripped of their official capacity to prosecute as indicated herein. Wherefore, Plaintiff has a right to have his day in court on the issues presented.

47. In Ex Parte v. Young 209 U,S, 123 (1908), an opinion written by Justice Peckman, quickly found that the Minnesota laws with respect to the railroad rates were unconstitutional, and moved on to the issue of whether the state official could be enjoined from prosecuting violations of such laws.

Failure to enjoin the unconstitutional statute would require the person subject to a potential violation to either pay the increased rate or face the threat of prosecution. Therefore, the Court determined that it would be unfair to require challengers of a law to wait until they faced a harsh sanction before they could bring any kind of action questioning the validity of that law. The Court also noted that, although a number of cases had held that the state itself could not be sued, those cases did not prohibit enjoining a state official, as an individual, from carrying out some task on behalf of the state.

Young contended that he was merely acting for the state of Minnesota when he sought to enforce its laws. The court disagreed, holding that when a state official does something that is unconstitutional, the official cannot possibly be doing it in the name of the state, because the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution means that (the Constitution overrides all the laws of the states, invalidating any contrary laws)Therefore, when a state official attempts to enforce an unconstitutional law, that individual is stripped of his of his official character. He becomes merely another citizen who can constitutionally be brought before a Court by a party seeking civil damages.

48. While there is no rule permitting a person to disobey a statute with impurity at least once for the purpose of testing its validity, where such validity can only be determined by judicial investigation and construction, a provision in the statute which imposes such severe penalties for disobedience of its provisions as to intimidate the parties affected thereby from resorting to the courts to test its validity practically prohibits those parties from seeking such judicial construction, and denies them the equal protection of the law.

49. The attempt of a State officer to enforce an unconstitutional statute is a proceeding without authority of, and does not affect, the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity, and is an illegal act, and the officer is stripped of his official character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The state has no power to impart to its officers immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.

50. Whether a state statute is unconstitutional because the penalties for its violation are so enormous that persons affected thereby are prevented from resorting to the courts for the purpose of determining the validity of the statute, and are thereby denied the equal protection of the law, and their property rendered liable to be taken without due process of law, is a Federal question and gives the Circuit Court jurisdiction. When the question of the validity of a State statute with reference to the Federal Constitution has been first raised in a Federal court, that court has the right to decide it to the exclusion of all other courts. It is not necessary that the duty of a State officer to enforce a statute be declared in that statute itself in order to permit his being joined as a party defendant from enforcing it; if, by virtue of his office, he has some connection with the enforcement of the act, it is immaterial whether it arises by common general law or by statute.
Page 209 U. S. 125

51. While making a state officer who has no connection with the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional a party defendant is merely making him a party as a representative of the State, and thereby amounts to making the State a party within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment, individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to commence an action, either civil or criminal, to enforce an unconstitutional state statute, may be enjoined from so doing by a Federal court.
Under such conditions as are involved in this case, the Federal court may enjoin an individual or a state officer from enforcing a state statute on account of its unconstitutionality, but it may not restrain the state court from acting in any case brought before it either of a civil or criminal nature, or prevent any investigation or action by a grand jury.

52. An injunction by a Federal court against a State court would violate the whole scheme of this Government, and it does not follow that, because an individual may be enjoined from doing certain things, a court may be similarly enjoined.
No adequate remedy at law, sufficient to prevent a court of equity from acting, exists in a case where the enforcement of an unconstitutional state rate statute would require the complainant to carry merchandise at confiscatory rates if it complied with the statute, and subject it to excessive penalties in case it did not comply therewith, and its validity was finally sustained.

53. While a common carrier sued at common law for penalties under, or on indictment for violation of, a state rate statute might interpose as a defense the unconstitutionality of the statute on account of the confiscatory character of the rates prescribed, a jury cannot intelligently pass upon such a matter; the proper method is to determine the constitutionality of the statute in a court of equity in which the opinions of experts may be Page 209 U. S. 126 taken and the matter referred to a master to make the needed computations and to find the necessary facts on which the court may act.

54. The question of jurisdiction, whether of the Circuit Court or of this court, is frequently a delicate matter to deal with, and it is especially so in this case, where the material and most important objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is the assertion that the suit is, in effect, against one of the States of the Union. It is a question, however, which we are called upon, and which it is our duty, to decide. Under these circumstances, the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264-404, is most apposite. In that case, he said:
Page 209 U. S. 143

"It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty."

55. Bunyon v. Burke County, 285 F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D. Ga. 2003). An arrestee ARRESTEE, law of Scotland. He in whose hands a debt, or property in his possession, has been arrested by a regular arrestment. If, in contempt of the arrestment, he shall make payment of the sum, or deliver the goods arrested to the common debtor, he is not only liable criminally for brought an action against municipal officials alleging due process violations and false imprisonment false imprisonment, complete restraint upon a person's liberty of movement without legal justification. Actual physical contact is not necessary; a show of authority or a threat of force is sufficient. The person falsely imprisoned may sue the offender for damages. . The district court held that the arresting officer violated the arrestee's due process rights by failing to take the arrestee before a judicial officer, and that a false imprisonment claim against the officer was viable. The court found that the officials responsible for incarcerating the arrestee for misdemeanor violations violated the arrestee's due process rights by failing to afford him an opportunity to post bail as required under state law. According to the court, the law clearly established that a pretrial pre·tri·al

56. Jones v. Lopez, 262 F.Supp.2d 701 (W.D. ex. 2001). A prisoner brought a state court suit, alleging that his detention for 253 days beyond the term of his confinement violated his due process rights and constituted false imprisonment. The district court held that the defendants were not entitled to absolute or absolute quasi-judicial immunity from the prisoner's claims, nor were they entitled to qualified immunity Qualified immunity is a doctrine in United States law providing immunity from suit to government officials performing discretionary functions when their action did not violate clearly established law. Qualified immunity was created by the U.S. . The court also held that the prisoner was falsely imprisoned

57. Defendants undoubtedly have foreknowledge that most indigent defendants live pay check to check, week, to week, that prolong incarceration is tantamount to homelessness, can’t work, can’t pay your bills. They methodically acted in concert and/or participated with each other to engage in the deliberate suppression of indigent defendants minimal due process right. Constitutional Rights to attorney representation at the magistrate hearing and immediate release at the preliminary hearing if not held in three days as listed above. Did mask those action s under the guise of legitimate court functions. Rather that in spite of the harm to the indigent defendants. They have (reaped a devilish harvest riding roughshod )over the civil rights of indigent defendants at the (expense of the taxpayers) for in or around 30 years.. page 15 See Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F.Supp.1286 Judge Tanksley quotes “[the] expense of maintaining a jail, with many persons who would never be there in the first instance if their case had been reviewed by a judge in an effective committing magistrate system, will be substantially less than its present cost and will certainly be a tangible benefit to all citizens of this community.” The Delaware County State Officials and Public Defenders office did know or should have known that 7their particular actions and/or inactions would lead to a particular result, and that this course of behavior would be deemed to be outrageous and worthy of condemnation

58. As we all know, the population of most prisons are African American, most are indigent defendants and are unable to obtain meaningful employment. As we have indicated our Civil Rights have been violated in criminal prosecutions in Delaware County. We have been disenfranchised in so much as, we now have INVALID records of felony convictions. We are being discriminated against because of a suspect class and compelled to unnecessarily labored under the yoke defendants system which placed us directly in harms way ,of being deprived of our right to hold government/state office ; vote ,possess passports ,possess firearms ,most government public assistances programs and/or housing programs .We have been compelled to undergo therapeutic behavioral modification treatment and other therapeutic treatment programs such as Anger Management, etc. in an attempt to acquire a favorable early release from illegal incarceration. Our assets have been seized and hefty fines has been levied against us in most cases. The defendants error in judgment subjected every person who ever supervised any of these programs, a party to the injustice and therefore, liable under the law. The Public Defenders office, whose primary responsibility, it was to protect the indigent’s defendants Civil Rights in this situation, new or should have known, that the indigent defendants, and/or African Americans Civil Rights were being violated by the responsible parties and failed to act. It can be theorized that the Public Defenders office acted in unison and/or in conjunction with the defendants because of there actions and or inactions.

59. PHILADELPHIA - The American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania and the law firm of Pepper Hamilton LLP filed an emergency petition in July for men incarcerated without legal representation. case (Cepeda a al. v. Court of Common Pleas for the County of Berks). Over the past five years, The ACLU petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to use its power to supervise lower courts and intervene in particularly urgent situations

The ACLU of Pennsylvania has contacted Lawrence, Beaver, Westmoreland, Clearfield, and Montgomery counties about similar practices and when the problem was brought to the courts’ attention, and they changed their policies and immediately released the incarcerated men with the intentions of providing them an attorney and retrying their cases.

60. Even this ACLU agreed upon remedy falls short of due process and violates the rights of indigent defendants, see the Supreme Court of the United States decision Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, (The Purdy Plan) Pugh v Rainwater 483 f.2d 778 fn20. (d)sanctions against the State in the event of noncompliance.

To ensure prompt implementation of its requirement of probable cause preliminary hearings, the district court included the following in its Purdy Plan order: If the magistrate discharges the defendant, the defendant shall not be required to answer to a subsequent charge for the same offense(s) except upon an indictment by the Grand Jury which shall have been returned within thirty (30) days of the defendant’s discharge, “336 F. Supp. at 492. If a defendant is not afforded a preliminary hearing within the applicable period set forth in paragraph (8) herein and the hearing is not properly postponed or waived, then all charges shall be withdrawn and the defendant, if incarcerated, shall immediately be released.

The State shall be permitted to refile a charge so withdrawn, however, in the event a charge is twice withdrawn pursuant to this provision, the defendant shall not again be held to answer to that charge except upon an indictment of the Grand Jury returned within thirty (30) days of the date of the second withdrawal, 336 F. Supp. at 493.

61. These paragraphs were at the time considered necessary by the court as a means for overcoming Florida’s long-standing practice of denying preliminary hearings to criminal defendants.

62 Thirty-seven years ago, Pennsylvania was supposed to adopt the Supreme Court of the United States decision in original Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, Purdy Plan as indicated above and implement an effective committing magistrate system and adopt a procedure throughout the State according to this Plan in accordance with said opinion wherefore, Pennsylvania does not reserve the right to retry any cases. These two provisions of the Purdy plan have been vacated 37 or more years ago.

63.In the Penn. 3rd circuit court case ,(Allison v. The Geo Group, Inc) has all ready settled any dispute regarding said strip search policy and its beyond doubt plaintiff was incarcerated during said period ,thus subjected to the same violations.

64. The Geo Group, Inc. claim they were not properly named in complaint and did not return said request for waiver of service which was submitted timely. Under the defendants theory a mere letter improperly arrange in a name constitutes improper identification ,there are many cases on the books which states to the contrary .It is clear defendants new the particulars of complaint and it was directed towards them, whether any one could be name specifically with any degree of legal culpability depended solely on plaintiffs ability to receive that which he was inappropriately denied discoverable materials, admissions, depositions, interrogatories, productions and inspection material.

65. This denial hamper Plaintiff’s ability to properly secure his claim thus receive proper investigation of those issue now in question . A pro se litigant civil claim should not be dismissed until he has an opportunity for discoverable material. There is no dispute that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard that formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct.594 (1972). During the initial stages of litigation, a Court is obligated to construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of a pro se litigant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3d. Cir. 1997). A fact is material if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505.

66. Are they legally responsible is the proper question. Yes, See docket # 42 the order that granted plaintiff 20 days to amend his complaint in which I did On 8-14-08 docket #43 naming both The Geo Group, Inc./George Hill Correctional Facility as usual it was denied as moot on 9-08-09 docket #54 As a direct result of this order and the denial of discovery plaintiff was unable to commit on record the specific name of those who may be legally responsible under the law. Plaintiff reiterates discovery would have revealed such liability in addition to much needed damaging information but I wasn’t afforded that opportunity .At this junction plaintiff could only identify the name of the place ware the illegal act took place and that should meet the legal standard for a pro se litigant.

67. Every government ,corporate and private organization has to do an investigation before they acquire knowledge concerning specifics of any particular matter. The court takes away plaintiffs ability to use the appropriate legal mechanism design specifically fore said purpose thus open the door fore defendants to present this claim, then rules in favor of defendants claiming plaintiff did meet the legal requirements. Said action has prejudice.

68. In any event The Geo Group, Inc. and/or George Hill Correctional Facility placed Plaintiff in harms way of serious injury and/or death when they require Plaintiff to sleep on a top bunks which are in or around 6 feet in the air and has no ladders nor guardrails. OSHA claims 100 lb. Drop from just 3 feet generates 1,800 lbs of pressure capable of killing someone and shouldn’t be taken lightly . All day every day Plaintiff was placed in harms way rather than in spite of the harm with full knowledge of these facts.

For example if you or any one were required to report to work (federal court house )included and the entrance to said establishment were lets say five feet in elevation and there were on ladders nor guardrails how then would you be able to safely inter the dwelling for work?.

69. Federal law under OSHA guide lines specifically states that;(Falls are the leading cause of worker fatalities in the U.S. construction industry. Each year ,on average, between 150 and 200 workers are killed and more than 100,000 are injured as a result of falls at construction sites. SEE Bureau of Labor Statistics U. S. Department of Labor . That stairways or ladders are required when the elevation changes by a mere 19 inches. See Laborers-AGC education and training fund handbook under general requirements concerning Ladder ways and stairways page -212- See page 190-Duty to have fall protection when an employee is exposed to falling 6 feet or more from an unprotected side of edge ,the employer must select either a guardrail system ,safety net system, personal fall arrest system or other protection system to protect the worker.

See ;VIOLATIONS

There are six types of violations used by OSHA:

Serious
Other Than Serious
Willful
Repeated
De Minimus
Failure to Abate

Serious

OSHA defines a “serious” violation as the following:

“A serious violation shall be deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment unless the employer did not, and could not, with the exercise of reasonable diligence know of the presence of the violations.”

This quote states that a CSHO must go through four steps to determine if a violation should be classified as serious. The steps are:

1. Establish the type of accident or health hazard exposure.

2. Establish this type of injury or illness that could result.

3. Establish that the injury involves death or a form of serious physical harm (when a body part becomes useless or use is reduced).

4. Establish that the employee knew, or could have known of the presence of the hazardous condition.

Figure 16-2 is an example of a serious violation. Does the OSHA form fulfill the four requirements of a serious violation?

Other Than Serious

An “other than serious” violation is cited where a hazardous condition would most likely result in an accident or illness which would probably not cause death or serious physical harm, but would have a direct and immediate relationship to the safety and health of employees.

Willful

“Willful” violations may exist where evidence shows that the employer committed an intentional and knowing violation of the OSH Act, or showed plain indifference to the law.

Repeated

A repeat violation may be issued for a hazardous condition that has already been cited and is substantially similar to a previously cited condition.

The “repeat” is generally based on the previous violation of the identical standard. The violations must be substantially similar for citations.

The “repeat” may be based on different standards, if similar circumstances or conditions can be demonstrated in both cases.

The “repeat” must be issued within three years of the final order of the previous citations, or within three years of the final abatement date of the citations.

See 1926.20 General Safety and Health Provisions.

Contractors or subcontractors can not require you to “work in surroundings or under working conditions that are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous” to your health or safety 70. Where fore as cited above , the case is clear no one not even The Geo Group, Inc. and/or George Hill Correctional Facility placed Plaintiff in harms way of serious injury and/or death but they do so every day when they haven’t complied with OSHA General Safety and Health Provisions concerning elevations over 19 inches there top bunks .

No one can legally sell you bump beds ,a house or any thing which hasn’t Incorporated in its construction the proper safety mechanism for fall protection .When an engineer firm make public its blue prints to construct a building those blue prints must meet federal and state guild line in accordance with OSHA regulations concerning elevations over 19 inches for fall protection .Lets assume those plan did meet said requirements. The question becomes what happen to the ladders/ guardrails and or the monies allocated for their construction. Lets also assume Murphy law come into play (what can happen, will happen) and some poor soul falls and dies as a direct result of this violation. This court could have prevented that death today by examining the law concerning the issues and or are responsible in some way because of this notification if it fail to act.

Thousands of dollars in fines have been levied against mutable companies over the years for just such violations ,construction halted until the violation is remedy. Yet its has gone unnoticed in the prisons industry because it primarily house minorities who be definition are unable to have the proper authorities investigate and or enforce the appropriate regulations because of there impoverished condition ,every one turns a blinds eye.

71. Federal and state law mandates that you have ladders/ guardrails for all entrance to any buildings most of which are less than the height in question how then can it be justified not to afford said protection to one who has to spend 70% of the day under those conditions . The prisons system as it were today with its lock down policy requiring inmates for security purposes to spend most of the day housed in there cells.

8.What action do you the court of appeals to take in this case.?

A. Declare the Defendants acted without the authority of law and the prosecutions in question were illegal acts. .

B. Declare Pennsylvania has state statutes , rules of criminal procedures, case law ,that are inconsistence with the Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490 opinion .

C. Declare plaintiff has been disenfranchised ,that every conviction implemented against plaintiff documented in Pennsylvania under the violations in question are invalid .

D. Declare defendants strip search policy is illegal that the ladders and guardrails are hazardous/dangerous to your health and safety thus, are in violation of OSHA height restriction.

E. Grant plaintiffs prayer for relief in his original complaint.

72. Enclosing, Plaintiff will adopt the Brief of Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid and Defender Association cite as Westlaw 1974 Wl 186449(U.S.) Closing argument.. …The interest of respondents is remaining free until a judicial officer or body has determined that they should be incarcerated and that they received the minimal due process rights in accordance with , Supreme Court of the United States opinion and judgment outlined in Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490, is obviously at least as substantial as the interest *9 in public assistance, the purchase of liquor, a driver’s license or conditional liberty. The accused is presumed innocent, and his Liberty should not be taken without good cause. An accusation, even where brought by a prosecuting official, does not necessarily result in conviction. [FN*] Yet the deprivations resulting from loss of liberty can never be made good.

73. The American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania was successful in petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to use its power to supervise lower courts and intervene in particularly urgent situations in Lawrence, Beaver, Westmoreland, Clearfield, and Montgomery counties over the past five years for men incarcerated without legal representation in those civil cases because of the argument presented 37 years ago by Brief of Amicus Curiae National Legal Aid and Defender Association in the case of Pugh v. Rainwater, and its accompanying opinions.

74. Ex Parte v. Young, court ruling states this prosecution was proceeding without authority of”, “an illegal Act “ and “the officer is stripped of his official character” would be the equivalent of say (a prosecutor and judge being disbarred from practicing law) invalidating all convictions in said state. The Supreme Court of the United States held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution, also if the party is denied any of his/her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of “interference with interstate commerce”

75. The prosecutorial and judicial defendants can not allocate the legally authority that which they don’t legally possess them selves to any other state agent or agency to proceed in an official character as described here in . Plaintiff and others has been disenfranchised and pray for relief to restore our civil rights. Additionally because this process has been the official policy of the state of Pennsylvania for no less than 37 years every conviction implemented against plaintiff and others similarly situated inmates in the past is invalid wherefore must be deleted from all official records .Finally, plaintiff elect to amend the complaint to a class action.

Respectfully Submitted